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ABSTRACT
Deardorff [Journal of International Economics 36 (1994) 167-175] offers an intuitively appealing
test for factor price equality (FPE). He demonstrates that FPE is impossible if the set (i.e., lens) of
points defined by regional factor abundance vectors does not lie within the set of points defined by
goods' input intensities. This note demonstrates that empirical implementation of the lens condition
is problematic if the "true" number of either goods or regions is unknown. We show that satisfaction
of the lens condition is more likely when goods are relatively disaggregate compared to regions.
Andrew B. Bernard
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I.  Introduction 
 
Deardorff (1994) derives a condition for assessing the existence of factor price 
equality (FPE) across countries.  This “lens condition” requires factor endowments to 
vary less across countries than factor input intensities vary across goods.  Deardorff 
demonstrates that if the set points (i.e., lens) defined by regional factor abundances passes 
outside the set of points defined by goods’ factor intensities, FPE is impossible.   
Deardorff’s theoretical analysis has been extended by Qi (2003), Demiroglu and 
Yun (1999), Xiang (2001), Yun (2003) and Wong and Yun (2003).  These extensions 
reveal that satisfaction of the lens condition, while necessary and sufficient for FPE in the 
two-factor, many-good and many-country case, is necessary but not sufficient for FPE in 
settings with more than two factors.  Thus, while violation of the lens condition may be 
useful for ruling out FPE, a lack of violation does not indicate support for FPE.   
The lens condition has been used empirically to test for FPE both across countries 
internationally and across regions within countries.  These tests suggest that FPE does not 
hold across developed and developing countries but likely holds across regions within 
countries.
1   
In this paper we argue that, even in the two factor case, the researcher's lack of 
knowledge about the “true” number of goods and regions forestalls useful empirical 
application of the lens condition.  This unfortunate conclusion is due to the influence of 
data aggregation on lens size.  Lenses created with more disaggregate data are larger than 
                                                 
1 Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) show that lenses defined by country relative endowments pass outside 
lenses defined by the industries they produce.  Debaere (2004) uses the lens condition to argue that regions 
within Japan, the United Kingdom and India exhibit factor price equalization.   Empirical Implementation of the Lens Condition 
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the lenses created with more aggregate data.
2  As a result, satisfaction of the lens 
condition is more likely when industries are relatively disaggregated compared to 
countries or regions.  Because the “true” relative level of aggregation is unknown, the 
outcome achieved by any particular level of relative aggregation is difficult to interpret. 
Theory, unfortunately, offers little guidance for this problem.  A lens test of FPE 
should be based on regions that individually exhibit constant factor rewards, i.e., FPE is 
known to hold inside each region.  However, it is unclear how to identify these areas 
unless the existence of FPE is already known.  Empirically defining industries, or more 
precisely, empirically identifying goods and their factor usages, presents similar 
challenges.
3   
This note proceeds as follows.  In section II we show formally that industry 
disaggregation increases lens area.  In section III, we demonstrate empirically the 
sensitivity of the lens condition to data aggregation using data on Mexican states.   
Section IV concludes.  
 
 
II. Data Disaggregation Increases Lens Area  
 
  In this section we briefly describe Deardorff’s (1994) lens condition before 
formally demonstrating the influence that data aggregation has on its empirical 
implementation.   
 
                                                 
2 Debaere (2004) notes that use of more disaggregate industries increases the size of the factor-use lens. 
3 Davis and Weinstein (2001) and Schott (2003), for example, demonstrate important cross-country and 
intra-industry heterogeneity in production data commonly used to test the implications of neoclassical trade 
theory.  Schott (2004) finds that such heterogeneity exists even within very narrowly defined products. Empirical Implementation of the Lens Condition 
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A.  The Lens Condition 
 
Deardorff’s (1994) lens condition is based on Dixit and Norman’s (1980) concept 
of an integrated world economy (IWE), which has both factors and goods being perfectly 
mobile across countries.  An IWE equilibrium is characterized by a certain level of output 
for each good and a single set of goods prices, factor rewards, and production techniques. 
If it is possible to replicate an IWE equilibrium with factor immobility by assigning 
factors to regions and goods, then FPE is possible.  If such an allocation is not possible, 
FPE is not possible.   
An IWE equilibrium can be replicated – and FPE is possible – if factor 
endowments vary less across regions than factor intensities vary across goods.  More 
formally, this condition requires the set of points defined by regional factor abundances 
to lie inside the set of points defined by goods’ factor usage.   Figure 1 illustrates this 
condition via a Lerner diagram for two goods, two countries and two factors.  The axes 
represent regions’ endowments and goods’ use of skilled (N) and unskilled (P) workers, 
respectively.
 4  The solid lenses in each panel are made up of four input vectors:  the part 
of the lens above the diagonal sorts the vectors for the two goods in order of decreasing 
skill intensity, while the portion of the lens below the diagonal sorts them according to 
increasing skill intensity.  The dashed lines define the region lenses in analogous fashion. 
In the top panel of the figure, the lens condition is satisfied because the region 
lens lies within the goods lens.  In the bottom panel the lens condition is violated.   
We now examine how the relative size (area) of industry and region lenses 
depends upon data aggregation. 
                                                 
4 N and P refer to our use of non-production (skilled) and production (unskilled) workers, respectively, in 
the empirical estimations below.   Empirical Implementation of the Lens Condition 
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B.  Lens Area and Data Aggregation  
 
There are R regions (indexed by r = 1…R ) and G goods (indexed by i  = 1…G).  
If R and G are known and the appropriate data on their factor endowments and factor 
usages exist, proper lenses can be constructed and a test of the lens condition empirically 
implemented.  More generally the true number of regions and goods, R and G, are not 
known.   
Consider two factors, skilled workers and unskilled workers.  All goods use, and 
all regions are endowed with, nonnegative amounts of each factor.  Let each region’s 
share of skilled and unskilled workers be represented by the pair (nr, pr), so that 0 < nr < 1 
and 0 < pr < 1.  Let (Nr, Pr) represent region r’s cumulative share of skilled and unskilled 
workers, i.e., the sum of the shares of regions 1 through r.     
Sort regions according to decreasing skill abundance, so that the vector of R+1 
ordinate pairs  
 
 [(0,0),  (N1,P1),…. (Nr,Pr), (NR-1,PR-1),(1,1)],   (1) 
 
traces out the part of the regional endowment lens that lies above the diagonal.   The 
other half of the lens, i.e., the portion that lies below the diagonal, is found by re-
constructing the cumulative shares in (1) after sorting regions in terms of increasing skill 
abundance.   
An analogous lens for factor use can be constructed, where  
 
 [(0,0),  (N1,P1),…. (NiPi), (NG-1,PG-1),(1,1)] (2) Empirical Implementation of the Lens Condition 
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defines the upper (lower) portion of the factor use lens when industries have been sorted 
in terms of decreasing (increasing) skill intensity.  Note that under the assumption of full 
employment, total factor endowments equal total factor use, or (NR,PR) = (NG,PG) = (1,1).   
In practice, we observe both aggregated regions and aggregated goods. Let the 
term “industry” refer to an aggregation of goods.  The factor use of any particular 
observed industry is the sum of the usages of its less aggregated sub-industries or goods.  
Similarly, the factor endowment of any particular observed aggregate region is the sum of 
the endowments of its sub-regions.  The skilled-worker use (endowment) of aggregate a 






b a n n . (3) 
 
Proposition 1: The area in an industry or region lens increases with disaggregation if its 
sub-aggregates are heterogeneous in factor intensity or factor abundance, respectively.   
 
Proof:  Our proof is for the factor use lens, but the same reasoning applies to the region 
lens.  The number of industry aggregates is equal to A < G.  Starting with A=1, we have 
one aggregate, i.e. one industry encompassing all goods.  The lens is a straight line along 
the diagonal of the unit factor space.  Factor price equalization can occur only if region 
endowments are on this line.   
If A = 2, then we have two aggregates.  As long as the two aggregates differ in 
factor intensity, the industry lens has positive area.  Thus, disaggregating from A=1 to 
A=2 increases the area of the lens from zero to some positive value. Empirical Implementation of the Lens Condition 
  6
More generally, consider disaggregation from A aggregates to B disaggregates, 
where G > B > A > 1.  The industry lens is a series of line segments connecting (Nb-1,Pb-1) 
and (Nb,Pb).  Because the point (Nb,Pb) represents cumulative factor use of industry 
aggregate b, the factor use share of aggregate b is (nb, pb) = (Nb –Nb-1, Pb –Pb-1).  
Pick any particular industry aggregate a to disaggregate intoba ∈ .  If (na, pa) 
represents the share of skilled and unskilled labor used in aggregate a, then the resulting 
distribution of skilled and unskilled workers into disaggregates can be represented with 
the set {nab , pab }, where  
 






ab a p p     and     n n . (4) 
 
Order {nab , pab } according to increasing skill intensity.  Any particular 
disaggregate industry b will have a slope, pba / nba , that is either greater than, equal to, or 
less than the slope of the aggregate to which it belongs,  pa / na.  If the slope of one of the 
disaggregate industries is less than that of the aggregate industry, then there must be at 
least one disaggregate industry with a slope that is greater than the aggregate industry.   
Without loss of generality, if there are two disaggregates in a, b and b’, then 
disaggregation increases the area of the industry lens by the triangle  
 
 {(Na-1,Pa-1) , (Nab,Pab) , (Nab’,Pab’)}. (5) 
 
Since this area is positive, lens size increases. ■  
The top panel of Figure 2 illustrates the intuition behind Proposition 1.  Assume 
we begin with three industry aggregates (A=3).  Aggregate 1 is represented by the Empirical Implementation of the Lens Condition 
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segment OA, aggregate 2 by segment AB, and aggregate 3 by BC.  The upper half of the 
lens is represented by the polygon OABC.  If we disaggregate the third aggregate into 
two sub-aggregates, the sum of the two resulting vectors must be equal to that of the 
original, third aggregate.  As long as at least one sub-aggregate differs in skill intensity 
from its aggregate, the resulting triangle BQC has positive area, and the area of the lens 
increases with industry disaggregation.   The bottom panel of Figure 2 illustrates how this 
increase in lens area is distributed across the lens by re-ordering the sub-aggregate 
industries according to their skill intensity.    
Proposition 1 and Figure 2 indicate that finding a violation of the lens condition is 
sensitive to the relative aggregation of goods and regions.  The likelihood of finding a 
violation of the lens condition increases with industry lens size (i.e., industry 
disaggregation) and decreases with region lens size (i.e., region aggregation).  We now 
turn to an empirical demonstration of these implications.   
 
III. Mexico:  An Empirical Example 
 
In this section, we show how varying the level of industry aggregation can induce 




Mexico's industrial census is conducted by the Institutio Nactional de Estadística 
Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Mexico's national statistical agency. We use 
manufacturing data from the 1986 and 1999 Industrial Censuses, which provide data for Empirical Implementation of the Lens Condition 
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the year prior to the survey.
5  The Census contains information on the employment of 
production (unskilled) workers (obreros) and non-production (skilled) workers 
(empleados), as well as aggregate payments to each type of worker (the wagebills).
6  The 
most disaggregate level of industry categorization in the data is the six-digit Clasificación 
Mexicana de Actividades y Productos (CMAP).  We construct lenses using six-, four-, 
three-, and two-digit CMAP industries, which break production into 314, 54, 29 and 9 
aggregates, respectively.  The data cover 32 Mexican regions (31 states and the Federal 
District, i.e., Mexico City). 
 
B. Empirical Results 
 
Figure 3 reports separate lenses for six-, four- , three- and two-digit CMAP 
industries and 32 Mexican regions for the most recent year of the sample, 1999.  An 
alternate view of these lenses is provided in Figure 4, which graphs the vertical distance 
between region and industry lenses in the below-diagonal portion of the lenses against the 
cumulative share of unskilled labor.  Figure 4 makes use of a convenient algorithm for 
automating the search for lens condition violations by checking numerically whether 
 
  ( ) ( ) 0 ] [ min ≤ − P N P N i r p  (6)   
 
                                                 
5 More information about the Mexican Industrial Census can be found at http://www.inegi.gob.mx. 
6 Use non-production worker status as a proxy for skilled workers seems to capture much of the skill 
segregation between industries in Mexico.  Robertson (2004) shows that Mexican production workers have 
less education in every industry than non-production workers, and that industries with a higher ratio of non-
production workers also have higher average education levels.   Empirical Implementation of the Lens Condition 
  9
for 0 < P < 1.   Non-positive differences in equation (6) indicate a violation of the lens 
condition because the cumulative endowment share of skilled workers is less than the 
cumulative industry use share of skilled workers. 
Figures 3 and 4 summarize results for 1999.  They demonstrate that the likelihood 
of finding a violation of the lens condition is sensitive to the relative disaggregation of 
industries and regions.  The figures show that, holding the number of regions and 
therefore the region lens constant, industry disaggregation increases the relative distance 
between industry and region lenses.  Thus, while the lens condition is violated for 2-digit 
industries, it is satisfied for 3-, 4- and 6-digit industries.  The results in Figure 5 offer a 
similar conclusion for 1986.   
Holding industry aggregation constant and increasing region aggregation renders 
satisfaction of the lens condition more likely in analogous fashion.  We do not 
demonstrate this sensitivity here because there is no natural grouping of Mexican states 
into “super” states.  Disaggregating Mexican states into smaller geographic areas – 
which, as noted in the introduction, may more closely resemble the labor market areas 
implied by theory – on the other hand, increases region lens size and therefore increases 
the likelihood of finding a violation of the lens condition.  We do not perform this 
exercise because confidentiality restrictions prohibit disclosure of results based on more 




Deardorff’s (1994) lens condition provides useful intuition about the theoretical 
conditions giving rise to factor price equality.  Unfortunately, empirical implementation Empirical Implementation of the Lens Condition 
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of this condition is systematically biased by the level of aggregation of either regions or 
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Figure 3:  Mexican Industry and Region Lenses, 1999 
 
 
Notes:   N and P represent cumulative endowments (region lens) and use (industry lens) of skilled and 
unskilled workers, respectively.  The region lens is comprised of the 32 states in each panel.  The industry 
lenses are constructed from 9 two-digit industries, 29 three-digit industries, 54 four-digit industries, or 314 
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 Figure 4: Normalized Mexican Industry and Region Lenses, 1999 
 
 
Notes:   N and P represent cumulative endowments (region lens) and use (industry lens) of skilled and unskilled 
workers, respectively.  The four lines in this graph represent four different levels of industry aggregation that 
correspond to Figure 3.  The level of aggregation is denoted by the number closest to each curve.  Each line 
represents the difference between the lower half of the (symmetric) regional lens and the lower half of the 
(symmetric) industry lens as a function of P.  The lens condition fails if the difference is zero or negative, which 
implies that the regional lens crosses (and therefore a part exists outside of) the industry lens. The regional lens is 
comprised of the 32 states.  The industry lenses are constructed from, respectively,  9 two-digit industries, 29 three-
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Notes:  N and P represent cumulative endowments (region lens) and use (industry lens) of skilled and unskilled 
workers, respectively.  The four lines in this graph represent four different levels of industry aggregation that 
correspond to Figure 3.  The level of aggregation is denoted by the number closest to each curve.  Each line 
represents the difference between the lower half of the (symmetric) regional lens and the lower half of the 
(symmetric) industry lens as a function of P.  The lens condition fails if the difference is zero or negative, which 
implies that the regional lens crosses (and therefore a part exists outside of) the industry lens. The regional lens is 
comprised of the 32 states.  The four lines in this graph represent four different levels of industry aggregation, 
denoted by the number closest to each curve.  The industry lenses are constructed from, respectively,  9 two-digit 
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